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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to explain the national 
relevance of local elections through an examination of 
the rise of the Socialist party to national power in 
France. I will prove that the 1981 presidential victory 
was not a sudden event; instead, it followed a series of 
concerted efforts to build a political base on the local 
level. I will cite four factors which must be present in 
order for a party to develop a political strategy which 
it then may employ nationally: a decentralized government;
significant voter participation in municipal elections; 
the party's prior exclusion from power at the national 
level; and the ability of the party to form flexible 
coalitions. In addition to citing examples from other 
Western European countries, I will illustrate my thesis 
with a detailed study of the rise of the Socialist 
party in Lyon, Rennes and Nantes in the municipal 
elections of 1971, 1977 and 1983.
vi
THE RISE OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY IN FRANCE
INTRODUCTION
There are three essential items for any dinner table 
in France: a loaf of bread, a bottle of wine, and a
discussion of politics. The recent phenomenon of a 
Socialist government in a nation which still retains 
vestiges of its monarchical past has raised such political 
discussions to a fevered pitch. Every Frenchman has his 
own opinion of the Socialist regime headed by President 
Francois Mitterrand, from the Parisian plastic surgeon 
who describes it as "a nightmare from.which France will 
soon awaken" to the teacher in Draguignan who proclaims 
"Our country is finally listening to all of its people, 
not just the upper-class."
This thesis represents an effort to explain the rise 
of the Socialist party to national power through a study 
of the national relevance of local elections. I wish to 
prove that the 1981 presidential victory was not a sudden 
event; rather it followed a series of concerted efforts 
to build a political base on the local level. By gaining 
control of many large cities, the Socialists were able to 
earn a local reputation and cultivate Socialist support 
on a regional level, facilitating their subsequent national 
success.
3 .
I have selected three French cities for study: Lyon,
Nantes and Rennes. These cities have certain common 
traits: all three are large, urban-industrial areas, with
politically-diverse populations. Because of their 
locations, they are less subject to large influxes of im­
migrants. In addition, the three are economically diverse, 
with representatives from primary, secondary, and tertiary 
sectors.
To explore the ramifications of the Socialists' rise 
to power, I will study three municipal elections: 1971,
1977 and 1983. These elections were significant in that 
they formally capitalized upon the municipal elections of 
1965--the beginning of Socialist-Communist cooperation in 
that with the election of 1965 the Socialist party and 
the Communist party formally established joint lists in a 
number of large cities in an effort to defeat the Right.
The elections of 1971 and 1977, in particular, espoused 
the political lesson learned in 1965: that only through
cooperation and alliance could the Left hope to defeat 
the Right. The elections of 1971 and 1977 will show how 
the Socialist party gradually consolidated electoral 
power or built upon a previously-developed political 
base; the 1983 municipal election will reflect voter 
reaction to the Socialists as both a local and a national 
force, following their 1981 presidential victory.
Although this thesis concentrates on data from three
cities, it is not intended to be exclusive. Rather, I 
hope that these three cities will serve as examples 
proving the validity of my hypothesis that a political 
movement does not always radiate out from the capital to 
more provincial areas. Instead, in the presence of four 
primary factors, a party may effectively develop a 
political strategy on the municipal level which it then 
may employ nationally. These factors are: the presence
of a decentralized government; significant voter partici­
pation in municipal elections; the party's prior exclusion 
from power at the national level; and the ability of the 
party to form flexible coalitions.
In the chapters which follow, the examples of Lyon, 
Rennes and Nantes, as well as other Western European 
nations, will illustrate how, in the presence of these 
four factors, a political party may attain national success 
by first gaining support locally, in urban areas outside 
of the capital.
CHAPTER I 
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN FRANCE:
A Comparative Study of Local Politics in Western Europe
Before exploring the results of the municipal 
elections in Lyon, Rennes and Nantes, it is important to 
first understand the context of the municipal system in 
France. The mechanics of local elections not only provide 
a vital framework for any study of municipal politics; 
they also offer ah integral unit from which to explore 
comparatively local elections in a Western European con­
text .
The basic administrative unit of French local govern-
ment is the commune, a town, city or village. Based on
the pre-revolutionary parish, communes were established in
1789. There are presently approximately 36,000 communes 
1in France. Each commune has a municipal council elected 
for a six-year term. The composition and electoral system 
for the councils varies with the size of the commune.
Municipal councils are responsible for regulating the 
affairs of the municipality. The council selects one of 
its members as mayor and then supervises his governmental 
activities. Although the mayor usually declares his in­
tention of seeking the mayoral post before an election,
6.
he must be elected as a councillor, and then chosen as 
mayor by his fellow councillors. Thus, it is vital for 
the mayor to form pre-election coalitions carefully and 
wisely, since not only he, but also his political allies 
must be elected in order for him to assume the mayoral 
pos t.
The mayor is charged with implementing national 
laws, the registration of births, marriages and deaths, 
the maintenance of electoral lists, and the issuing of 
building permits. He is responsible for keeping order, 
but his police force is financed and controlled by the 
national government. Thus, there are many national 
checks which prevent any local official from becoming 
too powerful or autonomous. However, the mayor of a large 
municipality is able to exert a certain amount of influence 
on his party on a national level, and if his local popu­
larity and effectiveness remain constant, he may be
elected to the Parliament, where he may influence national
2policy directly.
The mayor frequently runs municipal affairs in a 
personal manner, developing popularity based on his 
personality. If the council remains actively and un­
animously satisfied with his decisions, this signifies 
that the municipality is politically united.
Municipal elections are held on Sundays. In 1971 
and 1977, the first and second rounds of the elections
7 .
were held on the second and third Sundays in March, while 
in 1983 they were held on the first and second Sundays of 
the month. Voting locations are open from 8:00AM to 
6:00PM, and voters are required to present a voting card, 
demonstrating their registration, and one additional piece 
of identification before casting their ballot.
The laws governing municipal elections have undergone 
significant changes in the past two decades. On June 27, 
1964, a law was passed eliminating the system of pro­
portional representation in all cities with populations 
greater than 30,000. Previously each party could present 
a candidate or list of candidates, and based upon the 
election results, each party was rewarded with a pro­
portional number of council seats. This often resulted 
in council members with widely-divergent ideologies, 
unable to act cohesively or effectively.
Following the 1964 law, municipal elections have 
been conducted under the two-ballot system. Each party 
or coalition presents a complete list to fill all the 
seats on the council. The leader of the victorious list 
is expected to be the mayor, and is normally elected to 
that office by his colleagues at the first council
3
meeting following the election. Voters may only choose 
a complete list, and lists are "blocked," meaning that 
they can't be modified between ballots. Thus, it is to 
the advantage of many political parties to ensure victory
by presenting a joint list, with candidates from two or
more parties represented. Since the lists are blocked,
these coalitions must be coherent and organized before the
campaign begins. Due to these coalitions, it is often
impossible to arrive at a figure for the percentage of
4
people voting Socialist, or any other party.
This law is modified somewhat for Paris and the four 
largest provincial cities: Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse and
Nice. These cities are divided into sectors, each one 
treated like an individual city with its own election and 
victorious list. Paris is split into twenty sectors,
Lyon into nine, Marseille into eight, and Toulouse and Nice 
into three. The parties or coalitions wishing to govern 
must present lists in each sector; however, it is possible 
for opposition parties to exist on these large municipal 
councils if different lists prove victorious in different 
sectors.
If one list does not win a majority of votes on the 
first ballot, then the two lists gaining the most votes 
have a "run-off," or second ballot, one week later.
Parties which were unsuccessful in the first round may 
support the two finalists, but lists may not be changed 
to include new candidates between the two ballots.
Following the 1971 municipal elections, the Socialist 
Party (PS), Communist Party (PCF) and the Left-wing Radicals 
signed an accord on June 28, 1976 which declared that
9.
they would join together in all municipal elections to 
present a unified list: "the Union of the Left." As a
result, the 1977 elections were significant because of the 
remarkable success of the Union. Joint lists were 
presented in 200 of the 221 largest cities, in many 
instances representing a shift from a Socialist-Centrist
5
to a Socialist-Communist coalition. The Left gained 
control of 159 of the 221 cities, a gain of 56. The 
number of Socialist mayors in these cities rose from 46 
to 81 between 1971 and 1977.^
The following chart demonstrates the effectiveness 
of the Union of the Left, showing the marked increase in 
the number of Socialist and Communist mayors following the 
1977 elections:^
MAYORS OF CITIES WITH 3 0,000+ POPULATION:
Party: 1965: 1971: 1977:
Communist (PCF) 34 45 72
Extreme Left 4 1 -
Socialist (SFIO, PS) 32 40 81
Radicals 6 4 2 (M
Other Left - 8 4
Center Left 9 2 7
MRP/CD/CDS 13 11 9
UNR/UDR/RPR 25 30 16
RI 8 12 13
CDP - 12 -
Independents, Local 
Action, etc. 25 27 18
France is not the only European nation to experience 
the successful electoral strategy of coalition tickets.
In West Germany, electoral victory depends on the ability
10.
of parties to form coalitions. The German system may
g
be described as a "2% party'1 or "2 group" system. The 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) has never had sufficient 
voting strength to carry it into federal office on its 
own, and the moderately conservative Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) and its Bavarian affiliate, the Christian 
Social Union (CSU), only once won a popular majority (in 
1957). In most recent elections, both major parties have 
depended on a coalition partner, usually the Free Democratic 
Party (FDP). Free Democrats provided the essential balance 
of power in both the 1969 and 1982 elections. The 
recently formed Green Party is certain to become a factor 
in elections, both on its own and for its ability to serve 
as a coalition partner.^
In addition to the coalition, other factors were 
responsible for the successful rise of the Left in France 
in 1977. The economic and social factors (unemployment, 
etc.) sparked voters' interest in a party that represented 
both change and hope. While the programs the Left offered 
may, in retrospect, seem overly idealistic, to voters 
they demonstrated a difference from the Right. In 
addition, the Left appealed to youth, and by 1977, 
eighteen-year-olds could vote. Good organization and 
leadership at the local level, and young teams who were 
willing to devote great energy to their party also 
greatly enhanced the appeal of the Left in 1977.
11.
In the spring of 1982, a law was passed stating that
"the communes, departments and regions shall administer
10themselves freely by means of elected bodies." The
law abolished the Office of Prefect, replacing it with
the Commissaire de la Republique. Both the city and general
councils were given increased power to collect taxes, and
the decisions of municipal councils were made self-
enforcing, abolishing the a priori veto of these decisions
by the Prefect or Commissioner. These changes were made
in an attempt to do away with the idea of national
11"tutelle" or guardianship.
In November 1982, an additional change was made in 
municipal election procedure, this one applying to all 
towns with populations of 3500 or more. A switch was made 
to proportional elections. Now, the winning list secures 
one-half of the council seats plus its proportionate 
share of the remaining half of the seats. Other lists 
that receive at least 5% of the vote obtain their pro­
portionate share of half of the seats. The hope was that
12the Left would make inroads into the smaller town councils. 
However, the 1983 elections were marked by a swing to the 
Right. Thus, right-wing parties proved the initial 
beneficiaries of these decentralist policies.
In the first round of the 1983 elections, the Right 
won 50.9% of the vote and captured about twenty of the 
larger cities from the Left. However, with voter turnout
12.
reaching 80% in the second round, the left-wing groups
received approximately 50% of the votes while the Right
13slipped to 49%. Marseille, Lille, Rennes and other
large towns which had seemed threatened were retained by
the Socialists.
As the following chart demonstrates, the past two
decades have witnessed some swift changes in municipal
politics. In a sense, these changes have been harbingers
14of similar changes on the national level.
MAYORS OF CITIES WITH POPULATIONS OF 30,000+ (except Paris)
Year PC PS Other Center RI UDR/RPR
Left
1965 39 41 9 63 12 28
1971 50 46 7 70 20 27
1977 72 81 6 33 13 15
1983 57 68 2 ^  58 ^ 35
West Germany, Britain, Italy and Spain: Local Elections
in Comparison
Additional insight may be gained by studying the role 
of local politics in other Western European nations. As 
opposed to the U.S., these nations have shared both a 
similar history of class-based politics and the economic 
ravages of war. The political developments these have 
incurred, both nationally and especially locally, provide 
an interesting comparison for the events in France. More 
importantly, the nations of Western Europe offer several 
clear examples of ways in which a national party's political
13 .
strategy can frequently be best served by first focusing on 
the local level, taking advantage of the opportunity to 
foster regional support, build coalitions, and demonstrate 
their ability to govern in the municipal forum.
In many ways, West Germany is the best model for 
comparison with France amongst other Western European 
nations. As previously discussed, German parties have 
learned the value of coalitions, and the elections, both 
national and local, have thus tended to be dominated by 
two groups: one moderately-conservative, the other
moderately-socialist.
The rise of the Socialist party in France is similar
to the rise of the SPD in Germany. In 1969, the SPD won
elections by concentrating on promoting the interests of
labor and policies of social welfare, relegating to second
place the more Marxist ideology and their policies of
15nationalizing industry. They attracted 42.7% of the 
votes in regional elections, then moved on to win an 
impressive voctory in the 1972 federal election by forming 
a coalition with the FDP. They held onto the reins of 
government until the FDP defected to the CDU/CSU in 
1982 . 16
Local power in Germany is vested in the Lander, 
regional governments similar to American states. The 
Lander control the police, education, and the radio and 
television stations. West Germany has a field system of
14 .
administration with only a very small number of bureaucrats 
in the federal capital of Bonn. Thus, the federal govern­
ment has no choice but to negotiate and cooperate with
17the centers of state power.
Lander elections are held once every four years but 
staggered over the three years following each federal 
election. As a result, the outcomes of these regional 
elections have been variously interpreted as barometers of 
support for both the government coalition and the parliamen­
tary opposition. The political composition of the Bundesrat 
(Federal Council, through which Lander governments cooperate 
in federal legislation and administration) is directly 
affected by the outcome of these Lander elections. Although 
the CDU/CSU was out of the national government from 1969 
through 1982, it enjoyed a Bundesrat majority, consolidating
its strength in the Lander whilst being in opposition in
18the federal government.
Voting participation in local elections ranges from
50-85% (more than double that in the U.S., but slightly
19lower than that in France). As in France, the pro­
portional representation list is used, ensuring that rep­
resentation is given to a wide range of opinions. Con­
tributions to local parties, but not to individuals and 
voter groups, can be deducted from income taxes, and local 
parties receive funds from higher-level party organizations 
for meeting some of their local election campaign costs.
15.
This represents an effort to divert the electoral focus 
from personality to party, and has been somewhat successful 
although personality continues to hold the same importance 
in German municipal elections as it does in France.
In marked contrast with France and West Germany, 
there is a clear disjunction between national and local 
politics in Britain. In France and Germany, the advance­
ment of a political career depends on having a local base, 
and parliamentarians are expected to act as local spokesmen. 
In Britain, many local councillors are localists, regarding 
Westminster policies as remote, and regarding themselves
primarily as members of a local political community rather
20than a national political party.
The problem in Britain is that there is a real inter­
dependence of central and local governments on the one 
hand, yet the central government holds the power of major 
decision-making on the other. The local authorities' 
powers are much less decisive. They administer most 
social welfare programs (except the NHS), including the 
schools and public housing, but all of the financing 
and regulation is controlled by national officials. The 
major power of local authorities seems to be in the way 
they follow Westminster's edicts. They have the power 
either to do nothing, or to delay implementing government
policies for a long period of time, or simply to be half-
21hearted about doing something they dislike. Above all,
16.
the central government cannot force local councils to do
22something well.
In Britain, political parties have their roots in
strict class bases. In most elections, the Labour and
Conservative parties have dominated, although third
party voting has risen from 9% in 1970 to 27% in 1983,
indicating that coalition-forming may become a crucial
23factor in future elections.
Party affiliation is also strongly affected by
region. Labour support is high outside the southeast,
in large urban or industrial centers and in inner-city
areas. Conservatives dominate a large majority of rural,
suburban and southeastern districts. It is estimated
that up to 3/4 of the people in England and Wales live in
districts which are under the "control" of one of these 
24two parties. Because party affiliation has its roots
both in the prevailing class structure and regionally,
membership in political parties is much higher in Britain
than it is in France, and party affiliation tends to
dominate personality, at least on the local level.
In 1972, reforms of local government eliminated many
smaller municipalities in which elections were frequently
uncontested. The creation of new, larger municipalities
encouraged national political parties to contest all
seats and the number of independent and uncontested
25elections fell sharply. Similarly, the party in op-
17 .
position in Westminster recognized that control of a 
locality was a good base from which to harrass the
4- 2 6government.
In recent elections, local elections held between 
general elections have brought sweeping gain for the 
opposition, as in 1981 when Labour captured control of 
all seven metropolitan counties and a large number of 
shire counties, as well. Such shifts indicate that 
resistance to implementing central policy goals will grow, 
and the government's ability to control local government
is usually weaker in the second half of its term, as a
,, 27 result.
In France, local authorities are able to implement
their policies independently, developing their own
budgets and financing. In Britain, the financial power
held by Westminster severely hampers the ability of local
representatives. In addition, the party in power affects
the type of local services provided. Labour authorities
are more willing to spend on housing, for example, while
2 8Conservatives favor law and order and fire service.
Recently, the Thatcher government has relieved local
authorities of statutory obligations to provide certain
services (such as school meals and milk), or a specified
type of service (comprehensive school), and encouraged
29the privatization of some local services. This will no 
doubt serve to further diminish the influence of local
18.
authorities, while underscoring the remoteness of West­
minster from the areas it regulates.
In sum, local politics in Britain--as opposed to 
France--are marked by regionalism, dependence on a remote 
national government, and on an M.P. whose ties are often 
much closer to Westminster than to the area he represents, 
and parties dominated by ideology and class-based membership.
Italy and Spain also provide an interesting comparison
with France as part of a Western European context. The
recent forces of social change and industrialization
have caused considerable imbalance regionally in these
two nations. The attraction of new industries and the
rapid rate of urbanization have created problems on a
regional level which must be resolved on the national 
30level. Socioeconomic changes in Western Europe after
World War II altered the class structure of society
throughout Western Europe, but the effects were felt
most strongly in Italy and Spain.
In the language of Almond and Verba's classic The
Civic Culture, both Italy and Spain are marked by a
greater number of "parochials1 and "subjects" than
"participants." The strong presence of the Catholic
Church served as a socializing force inculcating deference 
31and obedience. Authoritarian regimes discouraged 
participation by the people and allowed, even encouraged,
19.
distance between the upper and lower classes to grow,
resulting in a vast group of people who didn't identify
3 2with their country's regime. Only recently has this
begun to change.
Italy is markedly different from France in its
extreme regional imbalance. The north is peopled by
small, independent farmers who give strong support to
the Christian Democrats, a Catholic, anti-communist party,
33whose members total approximately 1.3 million. Central
Italy has a widespread system of sharecropping, the
mazzadria, and the injustices of this type of tenant
framing result in widespread support for the Communist 
34Party. The south is dominated by large estates, the
latifondi, which have fostered the development of a
cohesive rural proletariat; the favored party is the
35Christian Democratic party.
It is interesting to note that, although the Christian
Democrats have dominated Italian government, the Left has
been making inroads on the regional level, and seems
certain to follow the example of the French Left in moving
from local power to national power, if it can employ the
same effective tactics of building local coalitions into
national ones. The present membership in the Italian
Communist party is estimated at 1.7 million (three times
3 6the size of the French Communist party). More than 
1200 Italian mayors are Communist, and the left-wing
20.
coalitions are a strong presence in many of Italy's
3 7fifteen regions. The PCI's administration has proven 
very efficient, and the way in which it manages municipal
3 8affairs has alleviated the fears of many anti-Communists.
Spain provides a more difficult comparison with France
as its constitution is a mere ten years old, and the Spanish
elected representatives for the first time in forty years
on June 15, 1977. However, it can be noted briefly that,
in the past decade, four major political parties have risen:
the Popular Alliance, the Union of the Democratic Center
(UCD), the Socialist party (PSOE), and the Communist party.
The UCD disintegrated in 1982 following electoral defeat,
39leaving a void in the political center. However, it 
is important to note that there are many regional and 
ethnically-oriented parties which are also quite strong.
The Socialist party assumed power in 1982, due in 
part to a strong organisational foundation laid during 
the final years of Franco's regime. Unlike the Communists, 
who lived in exile and worked from outside the country, 
the PSOE was firmly positioned within Spain, with strong
regional bases, and thus able to mobilize support
t t 40 nationally.
A source of political strength, the regions of Spain 
also threaten its political stability. Addressing the 
separatist movement of the Basques in the north, and 
other regionalists' desire for autonomy in a multilingual
21 .
nation, is the most threatening problem Spain's democratic
4 1leaders face today.
Conclusion
The examples of West Germany, Britain, Italy and 
Spain offer additional insight as to how local elections 
may best serve as part of a political party's national 
strategy. Perhaps the most important factor is a decen­
tralized government, free of regionalism and largely 
financially independent, as illustrated by both France 
and West Germany, enabling political parties to demonstrate 
their ability to govern in the smaller, municipal forum, 
in addition to implementing policies and shaping regional 
concerns.
Significant voter participation in municipal elections 
is also important, so that election results may offer a 
viable tool for predicting a party's support on the 
regional level. In addition, a certain exclusion from 
power at the national level is valuable, so that parties 
may more clearly represent "a breath of fresh air" or an 
alternative to disillusioned, disaffected voters. The 
examples of local politics in West Germany, Italy and 
Spain briefly illustrated on the previous pages show 
that these conditions are not exclusive to French municipal 
elections.
By contrast, the example of Britain shows how the
22.
absence of these conditions can thwart leftist parties' 
efforts to build a regional base of support to yield 
national strength. Britain's highly centralized government, 
with financial power tightly controlled by Westminster, 
as well as its class-based political parties ensure that 
regional politics prove sparse sustenance for parties 
seeking to base a national political strategy upon local 
elections.
Under the right conditions, municipal elections can 
be an important testing ground, providing a forum for 
leftist parties to display their ability to govern 
moderately and wisely, as illustrated by the rise of the 
PCI in Italy. They also may offer an opportunity for 
the Left to build a base, fostering support regionally by 
focusing on regional, as well as national and ideological, 
concerns. The importance of the coalition also is clear—  
in order to stand on their own, Leftist parties must first
be prepared to stand together.
Further illustration of these "right conditions" can 
be found in the case studies of Lyon, Rennes and Nantes
to follow. Through their examples, I hope to prove that
France is a useful model for a study of the national 
relevance of local elections.
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CHAPTER II 
THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY
The Socialist party is the oldest existing mass party 
1
in France. It was founded in 1905 in an attempt to
unite the four dominant types of socialism: utopian,
syndicalist, revolutionary and reformist. Originally
titled the French Section of the International Worker
(SFIO), it existed as a federation of independent regional
units whose representatives were subject to fairly strict
party discipline.
While the SFIO was, in principle, committed to the
ideals of class struggle and a transformation of bourgeois
society, the party was willing to enter into a coalition
with bourgeois parties when the Republic was threatened.
Thus, the SFIO joined the government in 1914 in a "sacred
2union" for the defense of France against Germany. In 
1936, Socialist leader Leon Blum was chosen as Prime 
Minister of the anti-fascist "Popular Front" government, 
which included Communists and Radical-Socialists. This 
government instituted the forty-hour work week, a two- 
week vacation with pay, and other social reforms. This 
would prove to be the high point of Socialist participation 
in the national government for nearly forty years.
26.
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Following World War II and the Liberation, the SFIO, 
as the third largest political party, participated in a 
government coalition with Communists and Christian 
Democrats. It furnished ministers to moderate governments 
until 1951, and a Socialist, Guy Mollet, headed the cabinet 
from 1956 to 1957. Although the SFIO was a fervent 
defender of the Fourth Republic, many of its leaders sup­
ported the investiture of De Gaulle and the establishment 
of the new Republic, fearing that the failure of the 
current government would result in civil war. However, 
the SFIO was quickly disillusioned with De Gaulle's con­
servative domestic policies, and left the government, a 
move which considerably weakened the party.
In its new role as an opposition party, and weakened 
by a large defection of members, the SFIO experimented 
with various alliance strategies. In 1963, some SFIO 
members promoted the presidential candidacy of Gaston 
Defferre, the anti-Communist mayor of Marseille, to 
encourage a reunion of the SFIO with anti-Gaul1 ist center 
parties, including the Christian Democrats. When this 
effort collapsed, the party attempted a "United Left" 
strategy. In 1965, to strengthen their position in 
relation to the Communists, the Socialists established 
the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS), 
a mixture of the SFIO, Radical Socialists, and several 
small Social-Democratic groups. Francois Mitterrand,
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the leader of one of these groups (the CIR) was chosen 
as the FGDS president. Quickly consolidating his power, 
he became the joint candidate of the Democratic and Com­
munist left in the 1965 Presidential elections.
Meanwhile, in 1966, student groups began affiliating 
with the SFIO, hoping the Left unity could be developed 
to include the Communist party, which many felt was the key
3
to reviving the SFIO. "Unity and renovation" became the 
slogan.
While attempts were being made to revive the SFIO, 
a second Socialist party, the United Socialist party 
(PSU) was developing independently. The PSU split from 
the SFIO as a result of disagreements over the Algerian 
War and the need for "autogestion," or self-management, 
in various spheres of political and economic activity.
During the protests of May and June 19 68, the membership 
of the PSU grew by a third to 15,500; the student base 
increased to the point where 40% of the members were
4
students. After May 1968, the PSU shifted from the goal 
of winning over the working class to forming a revolutionary 
party. Internal debate over ideological positions 
resulted in the splitting off of various factions to the 
point that, by 197 2, the PSU membership had been reduced 
by half to 9,000 members.^ Although this move clarified 
the ideological position of the party, the loss of mem­
bership robbed the PSU of its political effectiveness.
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The FGDS maintained its electoral alliance with the 
Communists for the parliament elections of 1967 and 1968, 
but it broke down in 1969 as a result of ideological dis­
agreements between the SFIO and the PCF. As the FGDS 
collapsed, the SFIO was so weakened that, in the presiden­
tial elections of 1969, the Socialist candidate Gaston 
Defferre received only 5% of the first-ballot votes, as
g
opposed to the 21% for the Communist candidate. After 
this election, the SFIO ceased formally to exist.
The idea of forming a new Socialist party was advanced 
in 1969, and between June 11 and 13, 1971, a congress held 
at Epinay-sur-Seine proclaimed the birth of the Socialist 
party (PS). The PS was founded as a fusion of the SFIO, 
the CIR and Democratic-Leftist groups. On June 16, 1971, 
Francois Mitterrand was elected as the party’s leader, 
or First Secretary.
Created as a strategy for unifying the Left, the PS
proclaimed itself as anticapitalist, rejecting social
democrary. As such, it was much closer to the PC than the 
7
SFIO had been. As the PS began to demonstrate a successful 
effort to regain by means of a new, progressive platform 
the support of the working class, and also to attract 
young people, white collar workers, cadres, shopkeepers, 
farmers and Catholics, the membership grew rapidly, from 
fewer than 70,000 members in 1971 to more than 150,000 
in 1975 .8
Several factors were favorable to the rise of a
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Socialist party in the early 1970s. The decline of 
Gaullism and the limited prospects of the PCF resulted 
in a greater opportunity for development of the non- 
Communist left, especially within the context of increasing 
urbanization and a growing sympathy for Marxist and
9
Socialist ideas in certain sectors of the Catholic church.
Additional support came from the Socialists' decision 
to align themselves with the Communists in 1972, producing 
a "Common Program" of the Left. The "Common Program" 
involved a list of commitments for a leftist government, 
including a guaranteed minimum wage, a reduction of the 
work week, an extension of social benefits, a strengthening 
of union rights, gradual limitation of government support 
for parochial schools, and the nationalization of some 
industries.
The Common Program held up well during the 197 3
parliamentary election and the race for president in the
election of 1974. During these elections, the alliance
only narrowly missed overall majorities, and during the
1976 cantonal and 1977 municipal elections, the Left, for
the first time during the Fifth Republic, gained more than
1150% of the popular vote. The greatest gains made were
in those Catholic regions which traditionally voted Center
12or Right: Brittany, Normandy, Alsace and Lorraine.
In the municipal elections of 1977, PS mayors moved into 
twelve cities which had over 100,000 inhabitants, including 
Rennes.13
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However, in September 1977, the Common Program broke
down- There were several reasons for the disruption of
the alliance: quarrels over the meaning of the platform,
the extent of nationalization, the leveling of salaries,
and the proposed allocation of cabinet posts after a Left 
14victory. In addition, the PCF was concerned that local 
polls and elections results had begun to show that the 
PS had overtaken the PCF in electoral popularity and had 
become, for the first time since 1936, the major party of 
the Left. The PCF realized that the PS had been drawing 
votes from the working class, a group which the PCF felt 
was its special territory.
As the PS and the PCF began to split apart, four main 
factions emerged within the PS. The first was headed by 
Mitterrand, the PS's highly pragmatic leader. He believed 
that there was no realistic alternative to a break with 
capitalism or to the strategy of a left-wing union. He 
publicly proclaimed that a new alliance with the Communists 
must be formed. Michel Rocard led a second faction within 
the PS, calling for "new language and renewed practical 
policies" designed to divest the PS of "archaic" and 
"outdated" policies. This group felt that by reducing 
the commitment to statism and emphasizing a lack of 
dogmatism, the PS would be strengthened while the PCF, 
fearing a further decline, might be forced to a more 
democratic position, providing a firmer ground for re­
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negotiating the alliance. The third faction, headed by 
Pierre Mauroy, was allied with Rocard, but presented 
Mauroy as the peacemaker between the two factions. The 
final faction, marked by the left-wing CERES (Center for 
Socialist Study, Research and Education, founded in 1967), 
emphasized that a close relationship with the PCF was the 
first priority. They felt that this would be possible 
only if the PS adopted such CERES positions as demands
for extensive nationalization and a major redistribution
. . 15of income.
Following the March 1978 defeat, the PS decided to
begin extending its efforts, especially in those regions
traditionally unresponsive to the old-style, anti-clerical
16republican centrist SFIO. These regions were, to a 
great extent, Catholic areas which were industrialized 
later than the rest of the nation, including Brittany, 
the Rhone-Alpes region, and the Department of Doubs.
At the same time, the PS was helped by the deepening 
economic crisis, the widespread unpopularity of Prime 
Minister Raymond Barre's austerity policies, the hint of 
a scandal in the Elysee, and increasing tensions within 
the government majority.^
As the 1981 presidential election neared, Mitterrand 
began to adopt a new stance, quite different from his 
previous support of a united Left. In February 1980, 
he advocated a homogenous and independent Socialist
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government. In September of that year, he made it clear
that whatever the outcome of the first ballot, the PS
would not negotiate with the PCF between ballots. By
January 1981, when Mitterrand was formally designated the
Socialist candidate for president, a consensus had been
reached with the PS that success could be achieved if the
1 8PS stood alone.
Thus, the break-up of the Common Program, which was
generally viewed as contributing to the Left's loss in
1978, was in 1981 one of the principal reasons for
Mitterrand's victory. It forced him to demonstrate his
independence and thus reduced the charge that, once in
office, he would become a Communist "hostage." He became
less of a risk to those voters who, in the past, had not
supported the Left but were now eager for a change or
19to get rid of Giscard. In addition, he was supported 
by young people, not simply because he was a socialist, but 
because of widespread disillusionment with Giscard's 
failure to solve the unemployment problem.
The election results demonstrate the effects of these 
factors. The combined Left vote on the first ballot was 
46.9%, similar to first-ballot votes in previous elections: 
45.8% in 1973, 46.2% in 1974, and 48.6% in 1978.20 
However, this election demonstrated that there was a major 
shift within the Left, the PCF losing one-fourth of its 
electorate while the PS advanced to the highest figure
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since 1936. Following the first ballot, supporters of 
the PCF and even Lalonde's Ecologists were advised by 
their party leaders to vote for Mitterrand, giving 
Mitterrand 51.7% of,the votes in the second ballot to 
Giscard's 48.2%.^
The election of a Socialist president in 1981 high­
lighted the three factors which had marked elections under 
the Fifth Republic: the formation of voting groups based
on vocation, the bipolarisation of the electoral scene,
22and the nationalization of electoral forces. The
Socialists utilized these factors to their advantage, since
they could not rely solely on a solid party-member base
to supply a majority of votes. In fact, political parties
in France have few registered members. A maximum of 4% of
23registered voters actually belong to a party. As the
propensity of electors to vote for their party, whoever 
the candidate, is thus somewhat weaker in France than in 
the United States, politicans have been forced to rely to 
a far greater extent on local bases of support. Having 
begun their careers in local politics, national political 
leaders usually remain closely tied to these areas 
throughout their careers in order to foster that vital 
support.
This emphasis on local ties is carried over into the 
PS's organization. At the base, party adherents are 
grouped into sections, which always have a geographical
35.
base, whether a quartier, a commune, or some other locale. 
Members from the same business or factory form a section 
within that company to encourage party development. The 
sections within a French department form a departmental 
federation, which works for local application of party 
policies.
The National Congress is the supreme decision-making 
body of the party. While the Congress rules on all 
decisions, it is advised and governed by the National 
Convention and the Committee of Directors. The highest 
level within the PS is the Executive Bureau, a group of 
27 men and women who shape the direction of the PS.
Within the present PS, several factions exist. These 
include: a social-democratic and anti-Communist group
led by Gaston Defferre and Pierre Mauroy; supporters of 
Michel Rocard, the former leader of the United Socialist 
Party, who rejoined the PS in the mid-1970s and who brought 
into the party innovative ideas regarding industrial 
democracy, economic planning and regionalization; members 
of CERES, who call themselves Marxists and are committed 
to the alliance of all left-wing parties; those like 
Pierre Dreyfus anj Jacques Delors, relatively indifferent 
to ideology but using a technocratic approach to problems 
and known for their good relations with the business 
community; and the Mitterrandistes, concerned less with 
dogma than with election strategies and now primarily
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concerned with the exercise of power. These various 
strains of thought have complicated attempts at concerted 
policy action.
A curious dichotomy has sprung from the fact that the 
action of the French Socialist party on a national and 
local level has been reformist and moderate, whilst its 
doctrine has remained firmly tied to Marxist and revo­
lutionary ideals. However, the prevailing current in the 
Socialist party is a pragmatic one, placing work in town
halls and unions above ideological struggles and seeking
» 24to widen party appeal by acts, not discourse. Clearly,
the party's efforts on a municipal level are an important 
part of this struggle.
In a preface to the PS' La France au Pluriel,
Mitterrand detailed the party's goals once in power.
Primary among these was decentralization. Mitterrand 
stated
The Socialists favor decentralization because they 
believe that it is the essential means to give back 
power to the people, to permit them, in the place 
where they work, to <|gcide what is best for them 
and for their group.
However, since the 1981 election, the Socialist government's
strategy has been to attempt to reduce unemployment with
greater state intervention in the economy and policies
2 6designed to stimulate demand.
Other problems have arisen, including an upward trend 
in inflation, an increased budget deficit, a fall in
37 .
investment, a reduction in world trade, and the low profit 
levels of many companies. As a result, the Socialists have 
been forced to change many of the strategies made during 
the campaign. Thus, the policies they have pursued since 
1981 have been a combination of ideological traditions 
and reactions to economic pressures: selective nation­
alizations, tax reforms, a raising of the minimum wage, 
reducing the work week, abolishing capital punishment, 
slowing salary increases but increasing social security 
deductions, and limiting public sector jobs. In. addition, 
the Socialists have continued several Giscardist traditions, 
including a massive infusion of capital into globally 
competitive industries and into research and development,
the promotion of sexual equality, and revisions of the 
27penal code.
In sum, several factors have shaped the growth of
the Socialist party. In 1983, the PS counted more than
200,000 members, less than 50% of whom were from the 
2 8working class. The Socialist electorate had expanded 
to include the upper and middle classes, businessmen, and 
Catholics. The Socialists have continued to foster 
regional support by enacting legislation advocating the 
use of regional languages in school curricula, and pushing 
for greater regional autonomy.
Pierre Mauroy defined the objective of the Socialist 
government as to "ensure a successful passage from the
38.
29industrial age to a post-industrial age." The answer 
to whether future voters will allow the PS to remain in 
power to achieve this goal lies in the municipal elections 
of France's larger cities.
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CHAPTER III
LYON
Lyon has a population of 1.2 million and a two-
thousand year history. Since October 10, 43 B.C., when
a former lieutenant of Julius Cesar, Lucius Munatius
Plancus, founded a colony named Lugdunum on Fourviere, one
of the hills of Lyon, it became the capital from which the
Romans administered the three provinces of Gaul during the
1
time of Augustus. While the Roman Empire declined, Lyon
remained a city of religious importance, ruled by its
archbishops until it was added to the French kingdom in
the fourteenth century. With the Renaissance, Lyon became
the center of banking, printing and the silk trade in
France. It has remained an important center of trade and
commerce, and during the German occupation of France in
2
World War II, was the center of the French Resistance.
Lyon is the second largest city in France in terms of 
population, although it is only one-eighth the size of
3
Paris. Dairying has always been an important feature 
of the region, and the recent completion of the high­
speed TGV train between Lyon and Paris has condensed 
the distance between the two to a two-hour trip. Rhone- 
Alpes, the Department in which Lyon is located, is the most
41.
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important provincial manufacturing area in France, 
employing 10% of the country's industrial labor force;
Lyon is the largest and most influential of its centers,
4
with 35% of the Department's total industrial employment.
Industry in Lyon dates from the growth of silk manu­
facturing in the sixteenth century. Industrial development 
relied on a large textile Industry based around numerous 
small, family manufacturing units. The silk industry served 
as the base of industrial expansion, with the accumulation
of capital, a skilled work force and the acquisition of
5linked industrial activities. By the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, the production of chemicals began to 
expand, and both the chemical and textile industries 
became partly responsible for the subsequent development of 
mechanical engineering, which grew to become the third
g
pillar of the city's industrial economy. By 1975, the 
secondary sector employed over 45% of the active population, 
following an annual rate of increase in its labor force 
of 0.8% since 1968.^
Industrial employment has stabilized in Lyon. Recently, 
job growth has been the highest in the tertiary and 
quarternary sectors. Although growth has been somewhat 
hampered by the fact that control of the resources of 
many of the large Lyonnais companies is in Paris, the 
French government's strategy within the last few years 
has been to create provincial counterweights to Paris,
43 .
thus promoting greater autonomy for the Lyonnais region, 
and the politics in Lyon have reflected its position as a 
city which is gradually nearing Paris in influence and 
importance.
The Lyonnais municipal election of 1971 was marked by 
many outside factors. Lyon was plagued with an especially 
cold January, leaving a city with no snow or ice equipment 
paralyzed by several blizzards. At the same time, it was 
revealed that the mayor of Lyon, Louis Pradel, had used 
city funds to finance the completion of a major tunnel 
giving greater access to Italy, a national project. Local 
taxes were raised 25% to finance the project, and the news­
papers predicted that taxes would double within the next 
five years. The population was angered by the evidence 
that their tax money was apparently not being spent for 
their needs. Thus, Louis Pradel faced an unusually con­
troversial electoral climate during the two months pre­
ceding the March 1971 municipal elections.
An interesting dimension of the elections was added 
by the presence of Jacques Soustelle. The former governor 
of Algeria, Soustelle resigned in September 1962 and 
voluntarily went into exile following charges that he had 
been plotting against the State. He decided to make his 
political comeback in Lyon, where he had made his political 
debut when elected to the municipal council in 1951.
Twenty years later, he appeared on the municipal list
44.
prepared by Mayor Pradel, his friend and political ally.
Pradel was first elected mayor of Lyin in 1957, and
re-elected in 1959 and 1965. He had based his career on
a reputation of being "apolitical," surrounding himself
with every color of the political spectrum except communism,
which he violently opposed. The Communist newspaper
L 1Humanite described him as "apolitical in the way that
some people become vegetarian: on the condition that they
8can have a little red meat from time to time."
For the 1971 municipal elections, Pradel continued 
his efforts to seem "apolitical" by wooing members of a 
variety of political parties to appear on his ticket.
This involved more than two months of complex negotiations. 
For example, Pradel met frequently with Louis Joxe, a member 
of the UDR and the former minister and deputy of Rhone, 
during an eight-week period which culminated with the 
offer of five council seats to Joxe's UDR party. As a 
result of the increase in population, the number of 
members of Lyon's council was raised from 61 to 63, and 
the number of council seats offered to the UDR was raised 
to six.
While Pradel's opposition met, on January 5, to plan 
a joint declaration uniting the Communist, Socialist and 
Radical parties, Pradel assured his five incumbent Socialist 
councillors that they would be retained on the ticket. 
However, a few days later, on January 11, the Rhone
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Federation of the Socialist party announced that no member 
of the Socialist party would be allowed to appear on a list 
with representatives or members of the UDR and other 
reactionary forces, the same groups which had just won 
places on Pradel's ticket. Thus, the five Socialist 
municipal councillors who chose to keep their spot on the 
Pradel ticket were forced to resign from their party.
Part of the misunderstanding was a result of the 
demise of the SFIO and its replacement by the PS, as 
discussed in Chapter II. Pradel, himself, had been a 
member of the SFIO before assuming his cloak of apolitism, 
and many of his followers were also SFIO members.
However, as the PS took shape and began to grow in 1971, 
the Socialists made a decisive move away from ties with 
moderate and rightist groups, and toward a greater unity 
with left-wing parties. It was believed that a Socialist 
victory depended upon a union with the Communist party; 
Pradel, a virulent anti-Communist, could not accept this. 
Thus, the municipal election of 1971 represented a 
significant break between Pradel and the Socialists, and 
the emergence of the Union of the Left.
Economic development was the central issue during 
the 1971 municipal elections. Pradel promoted efficient 
and non-partisan municipal management as the key to achieving 
this, and it seemed that his list of centrists, indepen­
dents, former socialists, and others was proof of the
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power of planning over politics. However, his campaign
was somewhat affected by the visible presence of Jacques
Soustelle and his allies on the ticket. Soustelle enjoyed
the sudden attention heralding his return from exile,
and thus appeared in the newspapers nearly as often as
Pradel, himself. In one interview, Soustelle declared:
"I consider my participation on M. Pradel's list as a
■ 9 -
way to make amends to my friends and myself." He was 
eager to participate once more with his friends (eight of 
the 63 councillors) in the administration of Lyon, and 
clearly felt that his political return was of national, 
as well as local, importance. He and his friends organized 
a national congress at Versailles on January 23 and 24 as 
a forum for him to deliver his thoughts on regional and 
national problems and his opinion of the President and 
various other political leaders.
Soustelle's presence on the list sparked controversy 
even among the other participants on the list, especially 
among the UDR and Independents, who argued that his past 
would damage Pradel's reputation and their own chances 
for political success. In order to gain additional national 
support, Pradel had opened the list to the UDR and 
Giscardians. The arrival of the Giscardians upset 
the Independent councillors who would have to share five 
seats with them. Pradel's offer of five or six seats to
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the UDR's Joxe upset, the Radicals and Socialists. The 
Radicals were torn between a national doctrine of not 
participating on a list with the UDR and a partisan 
favoring of Pradel's policies. The Socialists who chose 
to renew their participation on the Pradel list created 
conflict within the Rhone Socialist federation involving 
the expulsion of many PS members. Thus, the Pradel "union" 
was not a harmonious one.
On January 28, the PC and PS, for the first time in
25 years, announced that they had signed an accord for
the municipal elections, and urged other left-wing parties
to join them. For the 61 council seats, the PS-PC list
contained 33 Communists, 15 Socialists, 8 Radicals and
five other. A different list had to be presented in
each of Lyon's nine districts or arrondissements; five of
the lists contained a Communist at the head, while four
did not. The Union of the Left hoped thus to supplant
the incumbent municipal council, consisting of four
Socialists, three members of the UDR, ten Radicals,
three members of the MRP, eight ex-UNR members (a group
supporting Soustelle), thirteen Independents, and eighteen
10apoliticals (including Pradel).
On February 2, the executive committee of the Radical 
Federation announced that it had voted 41 to 26 to appear 
on Pradel's list, apparently ignoring the words of the
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Party's General Secretary Servan-Schreiber, who said on
November 26: "We may ally ourselves with anyone except
11the UDR." On February 10, the UDR announced that it, 
too, would participate onthe Pradel list with 9 of the 
63 candidates, on the condition that no UDR candidate 
appeared with Soustelle on a list. Since Soustelle was 
to appear on the list in the first district, where the 
Hotel de Ville was located, no UDR candidate was presented 
there.
On February 14, the incumbent regime presented its 
official list, entitled PRADEL (For the Active Realization 
of Lyonnaise Hopes). Of the 61 candidates, 29 declared 
themselves "apolitical." The 32 others included 4 members 
of Progress and Liberty (a new party founded by Jacques 
Soustelle), 9 members of the UDR, 2 Independent Republicans, 
4 Radicals, and 5 former SFIO members. A condition of 
appearing on the PRADEL list was that each candidate sign 
an agreement declaring whether or not he belonged to a 
political party, after which he agreed to not attempt to 
create a political group within the main council, to submit 
all political efforts to a council vote, and to not use
12the PRADEL ticket in any other political consultations.
The list was also marked by six women, and younger can­
didates .
The PRADEL list was quick to emphasize the achieve­
ments Pradel had fostered during the past six years.
Despite these accomplishments, the Union of the Left
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received a good deal of popular attention. Its 61 can­
didates represented a variety of professions, including 
eight factory workers, two craftsmen, three social
workers, four housewives, four lawyers, three professors,
13two teachers, and one student. The list consisted 
of 12 women and 49 men. As the first such union in 25 
years, its program was not a catalogue of promises, but a 
list of objectives and what it would take to achieve 
them. With the list, the parties of the Left presented 
their united municipal contract based on three points: 
the democratization of all institutions; a more Socialist- 
oriented administration leading to economic development; 
and the decentralization of the bureaus governing culture 
and media for greater participation.
By the time of the election on March 14, voters had 
four lists to choose from: the Union of the Left; the
PRADEL list; a list presented by the PSU; and a list 
presented by the UJP, a party of Orthodox Gaullists. The 
results showed that, despite the victory of the PRADEL 
list, the Left had made important advances and paved the 
way for a future electoral victory. Of the 276,773 regis­
tered voters, 142,287 voted on March 14. Of these votes, 
the PRADEL list received 90,613, or 66.4%; the Union of 
the Left received 35,778, or 26.2%; the PSU obtained
9,166, or 6.7%; and the UJP ticket obtained 1,127, or 
140.7% Thus, there was technically no opposition on the 
Lyon municipal council, as the PRADEL list won all nine
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districts of the city on the first ballot.
In the six-year interim between the 1971 and 1977
municipal elections, Lyon experienced many changes. From
the beginning of the post-war boom in 1954 until 1975,
Lyon's population had grown by 37 0,000 to a total of 
151,171,000. By 1977, however, employment opportunities
in the large Lyonnaise industries had begun to decline.
16Unemployment had increased to 8.8%. The greatest rate 
of job increase had occurred in the tertiary sector, with 
Lyon benefitting from national efforts to promote business 
relocation and development in the regions outside Paris.
The municipal elections of March 1977 reflected the 
changes that had occurred in the economic structure of 
Lyon. On November 27, 1977, Mayor Louis Pradel died, 
ending 20 years of apolitical administration in Lyon. 
Francois Collomb was selected to complete the remaining 
three-month term; he continued Pradel's policies and 
announced his intention to run for mayor as the municipal 
elections approached.
However, the death of Pradel marked the end of uni­
fication within his party. Immediately following his 
death, Jacques Soustelle, the former governor of Algeria 
who had caused controversy in the 1971 municipal elections, 
had been offered by Pradel's supporters the position of 
Pradel's successor. He had refused, permitting Collomb, 
a non-aligned senator, to be unanimously elected on
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December 5, 1976. However, on December 21, Soustelle was 
named by the PRADEL commission as the head of their lists 
for the upcoming municipal elections.
On January 7, 1977, Soustelle officially announced
his intention to present lists in all nine districts of
Lyon. In spite of his ties to conservative administrations,
Soustelle denied that he would make up right-wing lists,
and declared that he always had been and would remain "a
17man of the center left." He promised to continue 
Pradel's apolitical stance by composing lists of candidates 
representing a wide range of parties.
Soustelle's candidacy created a split within the 
majority. He had maintained a clique of adherents who, 
even during his exile, remained to ensure his presence in 
Lyon. Collomb had managed to win several of these over 
shortly before Pradel's death, and his position as in­
cumbent mayor gave him a slight advantage, yet the party 
in-fighting was bitter and divisive.
Collomb received crucial support from Andre Soulier, 
a lawyer of local celebrity who had been a spokesman for 
the PS at Lyon. When the PS signed its accord with the 
PC, Soulier quit the party and joined the supporters of 
Collomb.
Collomb took advantage of his position as Pradel's 
heir apparent. A tall, elegant man with white hair, his 
distinguished appearance gave him a certain personal
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popularity which Soustelle could not match. In addition, 
Collomb subtly promoted the idea of his candidacy as a 
continuation of the Pradel "dynasty." In interviews, 
he frequently mentioned that he kept a picture of Pradel
on his desk: "Sometimes I look at it and ask him for
 ^ • ..18advice.
The division in the majority party was a welcome event 
for the parties of the Left, which had been steadily 
consolidating their support since the 1971 municipal 
elections. With the death of Pradel, the municipal 
election had become a political, as well as a personality, 
race and the Union of the Left was determined to emphasize 
its own unity to contrast with the disunity of the 
majority party.
On January 6, 1977, the PS and PC announced that 
they had signed an accord in preparation for the upcoming 
elections. However, the accord failed to solve a dispute 
surrounding the distribution of council seats. The PC 
felt that its greater popular support should give it the 
right to 27 of the 61 seats and 4 of the 9 heads of lists. 
The PC did offer the PS the opportunity to head the third, 
seventh and ninth district lists, three of the districts 
considered most favorable to the Left, which did demonstrate 
a willingness to compromise. However, the PS proposed 
that the PC should have only 22 seats and head only one 
list, in the eighth district. Negotiations continued 
until February 3, when the arrangement proposed by the PS
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was ratified, clear evidence that the PS was quickly 
assuming a more powerful position than the PC. This trend 
would be reflected nationally during subsequent elections.
Claude Bernardin was chosen to lead the Union of
the Left list. He had been instrumental in helping to
renew Socialist thought following the formation of the PS,
and had the added appeal to more conservative voters of
being a proclaimed Christian and a lawyer. Support for
the Union was evident when, on February 11, 15,000 workers
demonstrated in Lyon. Blocking traffic and disrupting
business as they marched through the streets, they
chanted "United Action" and announced their support for
19the Union of the Left.
While the Union was polishing its accord, Jacques 
Soustelle announced that he would seek office under his 
own party label, Assembly for Lyon (RPL). On February 5, 
the party was officially formed.
Even within the PRADEL party, disunity was publicized. 
When Bernardin proposed a series of debates with the 
majority leader, Collomb refused to attend, sending in 
his place Andre Soulier, the former PS member who was 
quickly becoming a media "star" as Collomb's official 
spokesman. Many of Collomb's supporters were angered by 
how rapidly Soulier was advancing within the municipal 
hierarchy, and upset by Collomb's refusal to participate 
in any encouter with Bernardin or Soustelle.
On February 25, Collomb presented his list, which
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included members of the conservative RPR, Independents, 
Radicals, and non-aligned. In order to compete with the 
youthful composition of the Left slate, and aware that 
the incumbent council had 27 members older than 65,
Collomb proposed 24 new candidates. However, the socio­
logical composition of his list differed markedly from 
that of the Union of the Left. While the Left proposed 
candidates who had a working- or middle-class background, 
Collomb's proposed council consisted mainly of doctors, 
lawyers, judges and company presidents.
On March 1, Jacques Soustelle announced that his 
RPL party would present lists in 7 of the 9 Lyon districts. 
In order to ensure that the Left did not win the seventh 
or eighth districts, he chose to allow the PRADEL list 
to go uncontested there. His list included three incumbent 
councillors and four others who were not placed on the 
Collomb list. Soustelle selected himself as the head of 
the list in the first district, where he had been elected 
on the PRADEL slate in 1971.
While most attention was focused on the lists of 
Soustelle, Bernardin and Collomb, five additional or­
ganizations presented lists in the Lyonnaise districts. 
These were primarily single-issue parties with small, 
concentrated groups of supporters: the Ecologist Movement
of Rhone-Alpes (MERA); the Committee to Defend the Sites 
of Lyon (COSI-LYO); the Friends of the Earth; the Rhone
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Federation of the PSU; and a Red Cross district association
known as the Hope of Lyon for a Balanced Urbanism (ELUE).
With so many competing parties and interest groups,
it was clear that the age of apoliticism in Lyon had
ended. This was primarily due to the rebirth of the
Union of the Left, which ended the prevalence of bourgeois
and clerical politics. The election results exposed
these changes.
The first round of ballotting in March left no party
in a majority position. The Union received an astounding
41.6% of the votes, while the Collomb and Soustelle lists,
together, lost 13.8% of the votes obtained by the PRADEL 
20list in 1971. Following a second, run-off ballot
between the Union and Collomb's list, the Left won the
eighth district with 54.85% of the votes, and the ninth
21district with 54.73%. Thus, for the first time in 
12 years, the Left won representation on Lyon's municipal 
council. The results were 12 council seats, five Com­
munist and seven Socialist. In total, the Left had obtained 
45.75% of the votes cast, compared with 26.2% in 1971, 
while the PRADEL party slipped from its 66.39% in 1971 
to 54.26% six years later. The Left had become a par­
ticipant in the administration of Lyon.
In 1981, the Left became the government of France, 
pressing its efforts from local to national success.
Despite a national total of 51.7% of the votes cast,
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Francois Mitterrand did poorly in Lyon, winning only in
the eighth and ninth districts, the same districts which
the Left had carried in the 1977 municipal election. Even
in those districts, the percentages were a modest 58.6%
22and 59.05% respectively. Thus, Lyon remained somewhat
segregated politically, and unwilling to wholeheartedly
embrace political change. The Left in Lyon was forced
to carry the burden of Socialist policies, as well as
their own political promises; thus, the 1983 municipal
elections would provide a forum for the Lyonnais to
evaluate the Left on a national, as well as local, level.
In the years between the municipal elections of
1977 and 1983, Lyon again experienced great economic and
social change. By 1980, the area surrounding Lyon
represented nearly 10% of the total population of France.
Fifty-one percent of the region's employment lay in the
23tertiary sector. Industry was no longer the primary
source of employment and income in Lyon, as the following
24chart demonstrates:
INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT IN LYON REGION:
Years % Mean Annual Rate of Increase
1954-1962 +1.7%
1962-1968 +0.7
1968-1975 +0.9
1975-1981 -1.8
Agriculture also experienced a serious decline in 
employment. In Lyon in 1954, 21% of the labor force
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was employed in agriculture. By 1980, that figure had
25declined to 5%. In 1982, the total unemployment rate
for Lyon had risen to 10%.
A scandal struck the Collomb administration on
December 1, 1982, when 29 administrative employees of the
Construction Corporation of Lyon (SACVL) sent a letter
to Mayor Collomb accusing the president of SACVL, Jean
Meriot, of granting permits for the construction of sixteen
social service buildings to a private company without
inviting competing bids. The scandal had several political
implications. Fifty-five percent of SACVL was owned and
controlled by the city of Lyon, and amongst its 12 adminis-
2 6trators, 11 were municipal officals. Meriot, himself, 
was a political figure, a former Rhone deputy, a deputy- 
mayor responsible for traffic, vice-president of the urban 
community and a close personal friend of Mayor Collomb's.
In addition, he had been promised to head Collomb's list 
in the second district for the upcoming municipal election. 
As the scandal grew, he was forced to step down as head, 
although he did remain a candidate for a council seat.
Other currents were flowing through Lyon in the months 
preceding the March 1983 elections. Problems were caused 
by the concentration of immigrants in certain areas of 
the city, despite the administration's efforts to re­
distribute them. As certain districts in Lyon became 
overcrowded and poverty-stricken, the rates of delinquancy 
rose. on January 11, 1983, a gang known as the "New
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Lyonnais" attacked two policemen. They sandwiched the 
police car between two other vehicles and opened fire on 
it. In response to public outrage over the incident, a 
force of 100 policemen was formed and, from January 17 
to 22, they arrested 21 members of the gang, including 
thirteen women. However, the 33-year-old leader of the 
gang, along with one of his lieutenants known as "The 
Bison," escaped the raid and continued to commit acts of 
terrorism and to operate a large prostitution ring.
Public safety was thus promoted as a primary issue of the 
1983 campaign, and more effective measures were demanded 
to stamp out this new breed of "gangsters."
One important administrative change preceded the 1983 
municipal elections. The number of municipal council 
seats was increased from 61 to 73, in response to popu­
lation growth within the city.
The municipal election of 1983 was described in Le
27Monde as "The War of the Three." Three principle can­
didates emerged as the mayoral race began: the incumbent
Francois Collomb, Socialist Gerard Collomb (not related 
to the mayor), and RPR spokesman Michel Noir. The cam­
paigns took as their theme not only the need for increased 
public safety, but the issue of age and the idea of a 
"new Lyon," contrasting 35-year-old Gerard Collomb and 
39-year-old Michel Noir with the 7 2-year-old incumbent. 
Posters emphasized this. While F. Collomb proclaimed
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"Lyon first," G. Collomb promised "Assure the future of
Lyon" and Noir announced "Lyon, the heart, Lyon, the 
,,28courage.
On January 9, Michel Noir presented those who headed
his lists and declared that his campaign would center
on five key words: energy, heart, rigor, courage and
ambition. Estimating the maximum cost of his campaign
as between 1,300,000 and 1,500,000 francs, Noir explained
that his financial sources would be a support committee
consisting of some 4300 Lyon RPR militants and the
national RPR. Many contested these figures, claiming that
it would be impossible to wage this kind of campaign for
29less than 3 million francs. He proposed a new contract 
for the city with three essential ideas: to freeze public
expenditures, to solve the most urgent problems (quality 
of housing, safety, employment), and to assure greater 
participation for all Lyon citizens in the decision-making 
process.
Concurrently, on the Left, Gerard Collomb announced 
his intention to compose a union list with the PC, MRG 
and Ecologists. He declared that his campaign would be 
concentrated on five areas: social action, the economy,
traffic and transportation, culture, and urbanism. On 
February 15, he presented his 221 candidates for the 
municipal and district councils. Emphasizing the priorities 
of the Left as housing, a city open to everyone, and the 
amelioration of the employment situation, G. Collomb
60.
revealed that PS candidates would head eight of the 
municipal lists, while a PC candidate would head the list 
in the first district.^
Francois Collomb chose to emphasize his record as 
the incumbent mayor throughout his campaign. On January 
17, he announced that his priorities during a new term 
would include completion of a fourth Metro line, a re­
vitalization of several of the larger city districts, the 
renovation of numerous city buildings, and more centrist 
politics. This last declaration prompted the UDF to 
mobilize in his favor, but F. Collomb carried a political 
liability in the form of the Meriot scandal. No longer 
was the Pradelian policy of apoliticism the prevalent 
view of the majority party.
Rhetoric dominated the campaigns. M. Noir declared
"Lyon needs a breath of fresh air," F. Collomb responded
31"You don't have my experience." Plans for ensuring
safety in the city dominated the debates. Incumbent
F. Collomb proposed the installation of a bodyguard for
elderly women, since retired persons represented 35% of
the city's population. Each district would sponsor
approximately ten bodyguards who, upon receipt of a phone
call, would go to the elderly woman's home, accompany her
3 2to her destination, and then take her home. Noir felt
that the answer lay in increasing the police force by
1000, and creating five additional police stations within 
33each district.
G. Collomb chose to depict a potential Left victory
as merely a continuation of Lyon's true heritage:
We are at a turning point. F. Collomb is the last 
descendent of the leftist line which was transformed 
by Victor Augagneur, byHerriot, and finally, by 
Pradel, elected by Socialist votes. No, this is 
not a rightist city. After the Commune, in 1871, 
Lyon took an independent socialist as mayor. It's 
simply that this leftist tradition has degenerated 
from socialism to the radicalism of Herriot. It 
was Pradel who took the most significant step in ^  
enlisting in his camp the. ex-members of the SFIO.
It was F. Collomb who demonstrated how greatly the
former Pradelian administration had changed when he
declared: "No, we are not apolitical. We are non-aligned
That means that we are clearly in the national opposition.
The lists suffered under the double blow of a fall in
the popularity of the PS at the national level and the
preference of certain left-wing voters for tradition over
change. Following the first ballot, the two Collombs
faced each other in a run-off ballot. The results were
decisive: a victory for Francois Collomb of 65.60%. The
Left lost even in its strongholds of the eighth and ninth
districts, leaving it in possession of only eleven seats
3 6on the municipal council.
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CHAPTER IV
RENNES
Since the fourth century A.D., when the Celts of 
Great Britain migrated to Brittany, Rennes has been a 
town of economic importance. Following a catastrophic 
fire in 1720, much of the ancient city was destroyed, 
and the classic style of architecture with which it was 
rebuilt provides a strong contrast with that of surrounding 
towns, giving it a more modern appearance. Twentieth- 
century Rennes is the administrative capital of the 
region, with a population of over 200,000, an established 
and prestigious university, direct air and rail links 
with Paris, and a wide range of specialized services and 
institutions.
Rennes lies at the heart of the Department of Ille-et- 
Vilaine, an area dominated by a highly agricultural 
population scattered mainly on small farms interrupted 
by two large towns, St. Malo and Rennes. Within the past 
twenty years, new industries have developed in the region, 
but the Rennes basin remains one of the best grain- 
farming centers in France. In the 1960s, industrial 
growth took hold, with the decentralization of electrical 
and electronics industries from Paris to Rennes. Rennes
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became the host for the large laboratories of Rhone- 
Polenc, Kodak and Fairchild. In addition, Rennes benefited 
from the transfer of Citroen factories, which created 
8,000 jobs in the city between 1962 and 1968.^ The late 
1960s were marked by an exodus from rural areas in 
Brittany, and Rennes served as one of the urban absorption 
spots.
Despite the influx of a largely youthful population
and the increase of industrialization, the Left in Rennes
in the late 1960s amounted to little more than a small
Communist party presence, unlikely to progress for want
of a strong union base in the factories, and a PSU with
a fairly strong base amongst certain members of the
2
Rennes intelligentsia. With the omnipresent Catholic 
church and a tradition of resistance to Paris and its 
centralizing administrations, the prospects for implan­
tation of leftist tradition seemed slight. The region's 
political sympathies overwhelmingly went to the Right,
3
either to Independents or to the MRP.
Preparation for the 1971 municipal elections in 
Rennes was marked by several well-publicized examples 
of city development. On January 2, 1971, an Olympic 
swimming pool was opened, completing the construction of 
a new sports complex, which included two indoor gymnasiums 
and one outdoor stadium measuring 1000 square meters.
The new pool was capable of containing 1000 swimmers
at a time, with seating for 11,000 spectators. Concurrently,
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it was announced that a new factory specializing in the 
manufacture of miniaturized electronic components would 
be built in the industrial zone of Rennes. The factory, 
operated by the Telephonic Construction Company (CGCT), 
was to begin operation in the spring of 1972, employing 
1200 to 5000 people.^
These announcements provided great assistance to the 
re-election campaign of Henri Freville. Mayor of Rennes 
since 1953, Freville expressed his eagerness to follow 
the example of Nantes mayor Andre Morice in the institution 
of several large committees composed of up to 30 residents 
capable of giving advice on local problems and issues. 
Freville proposed this as the best way to quench what he 
described as a "thirst for collaboration" in Rennes."*
A demonstration by approximately 1500 merchants on 
January 22, involving police action to quell the violence, 
seemed to emphasize the need for greater communication 
between residents and the municipal administration.
Freville quickly proposed to hold a round table with 
representatives of the merchants.
On February 1, a Breton Communist party was created 
following a constitutional congress held in Rennes. The 
party was quick to mobilize and assemble a list for the 
March municipal race. Labeled as the United List for a 
Social, Modern and Democratic Administration, the list 
was led by Yves Brault, the Federation Secretary of the 
party.
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This was not the only leftist list to challenge the 
Freville candidacy. A Socialist list was presented under 
the label Socialist Rennes. Emphasizing the ideological 
nature of the party, the Socialist slate was presented 
with no candidate leading the list as mayoral candidate.
The candidates were listed alphabetically, and included 
representatives of the PSU and CIR, as well as Socialists.
These two leftist lists seemed little threat to the 
Center-Right coalition formed by Mayor Freville, the 
Republican Agreement for the Development of Rennes.
Indeed, the only charges leveled at Freville involved the 
increased taxes necessary to fund the completion of the 
new sports center, which had become the focus of civic 
pride. Freville, a Democratic Centrist, labeled as 
"non-political" his list, which included members of the
g
MRP, Centrists, Independents and one Radical.
The list of 37 candidates included only 19 members of 
the incumbent municipal council. Amongst those not 
seeking re-election was Georges Graff, a deputy-mayor who 
had opposed Freville in several debates involving the 
constitution of Rennes' urban district. The majority of 
the other councillors were not seeking re-election for 
reasons of poor health or age, the mayor having all 
councillors older than 70 step down.
The new candidates for the council came from diverse 
backgrounds which, according to the mayor, would give his
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team "an apolitical character, even if the men who make
7
it up hold political opinions which could differ." These 
included three former members of the Federation of the 
Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS), described by
o
Freville as a "socializing influence."
A short but violent incident took place on March 10
at the gate of the Citroen factories outside Rennes.
Thirty militants, including fifteen candidates from the
Socialist list, gathered at the gate to distribute
political tracts. A group of workers leaving the factory
on foot and in cars began to chase them, throwing stones
and beating them with sticks. Grabbing the tracts from
the militants' hands, the aggressors pushed a few of them
into the dirt and then proceeded to beat and kick them.
Others, in cars, attempted to run down the militants
who were scattered along the road. Two council candidates
were doused with oil, and a total of six civil complaints
were registered with the Rennes police. A few days later,
on March 13, approximately 2500 high school students
marched through the city streets to the Three Cross
Agricultural School, where they proceeded to expound upon
charges that their rights had been violated.
Mayor Freville remained relatively untouched by
these conflicts. As a district official stated:
The mayor is wrong to take any criticism too personally, 
because everyone knows that the power of local of­
ficials is more and more limited, ^nd that success 
can only come by working together.
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Apparently, the majority of voters shared this view, as
Freville's list was elected in March 1971 with 31,178 votes,
58% of those cast. The Communist list received 16.8%,
while the Socialist slate demonstrated a surprisingly
10strong showing of support with 25% of the votes.
Rennes entered a new municipal term with a council con­
taining four Socialists, three Radicals, 16 Democratic
Centrists, eight members of the UDR, three representatives
11of the CHI, and three Independents.
The great change in Rennes brought by the 1977
municipal election was preceded by several changes in
the economic and demographic structure of the city. The
population had grown by 93,000 since 1954 to a total of
229,000 in 1975, and the gradual decrease in the pace of
industrialization had produced a high unemployment rate 
12of 9.5%.
Mayor Freville had remained a firm proponent of
"opposition centrism," voting regularly against the
Government and serving as an example of a culture that
retained enough of its Catholic and popular origins to
13think twice about unconditional support of Gaullism.
Under Freville's leadership, Rennes had been controlled 
by a Center-Right council, demonstrating what municipal 
leadership could achieve when freed from the necessity of 
consensus politics. However, the Left had obtained 48% 
of the votes in the preceding presidential elections and
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1453% of the votes in the earlier cantonal elections.
The fact that a percentage of the Centrist electorate 
was a popular one, coupled with the recent slowing in 
industrialization and the rise in unemployment, proved 
that Rennes could be vulnerable to a concerted leftist 
attack.
Additional concerns arose in February 1977. Late
on the evening of February 5, an act of terrorism was
committed by the Liberation Front of Brittany-Breton
Republican Army (FLB-ARB) in Rennes. Two charges exploded
by the north and south sides of the radio and television
broadcasting center of Rennes, located in the new district
of Colombier, where renovation of several old buildings
had sparked public controversy. This incident represented
the twenty-third attack by the secret Breton movement
since June 197 6. Four of these had occurred in Rennes
since October against what were labeled "the symbols of
the French occupation." These attacks served to dramatize
the FLB-ARB's efforts to create a "free, socialist Breton
state," by building a society without classes, restoring
respect for Celtic history and tradition, and reinstituting
the Breton language in Brittany. Every one of their
attacks was accompanied by a letter in which they expressed
their willingness to undertake a "real battle for national
15liberation," to fight until they were victorious.
Le Monde described the 1977 battle as a "university 
1 6affair." Rennes boasted one of the finest universities
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in the country, and the theses and books published locally 
featured municipal administration as one of their favorite 
themes. Mayor Freville exemplified the blending of 
academics and politics; as an historian, he had partici­
pated in the editing of a history of Rennes and had 
prepared a detailed study of power.
The campaign of March 1977 focused on; a debate of 
ideas. The list on the Right was led by Jean-Pierre 
Chaudet, an Independent, and assisted by the presence 
of Yves Freville, the son of the mayor. Mayor Freville 
had officially designated Chaudet as his successor when, 
at 71 years of age, he announced that he would not run 
again. Chaudet had served under Freville as the deputy- 
mayor in charge of urbanism and economic development, and 
chose to present himself as the continuation of the Freville 
political dynasty.
The challenge from the Left was led by a young 
Socialist lawyer, Edmond Herve, and by geography pro­
fessor and social activist Michel Philipponeau, whose text 
Changer la vie, changer la ville was published shortly 
before the election and became, to some, the debate at 
the heart of the campaign. The book criticized Mayor 
Freville's change from his original ideals to the single 
aim of achieving greater prestige, portraying an evolution 
in party members from Christian-Democrats to young, 
upwardly -mobile professionals.
According to Herve and the Left, it was only with the
1 2 .
assistance of Socialists and Democratic-Christians that 
Freville was elected 24 years ago, and the departure of 
Freville marked the end of a long reign of a Christian- 
Democratic tradition. In the preceding cantonal elections, 
three generations of Christian Democrats (Henri Freville, 
Henri Garnier and Gerard Pourchet) were beaten by 
Socialists. However, the 1977 elections also heralded 
a rejuvenation of the municipal administration, with 
34-year-old Herve and 38-year-old Chaudet vying for the 
seat vacated by the 71-year-old Freville.
The Union of the Left contained four formations: 
the PS, with 24 candidates; the PC, with 12 candidates;
4 candidates from the Radical party; and the Breton 
Democratic Union, with two representatives. With a 
steadily increasing rate of unemployment, the Left was 
able to pose sufficient challenge to poll 48.6% of the
17votes to Chaudet's 42.4%, necessitating a second ballot.
The Left did especially well in the most heavily populated
districts, receiving 65% of the vote in the region
inhabited by 2000 Citroen workers, and gaining a total of
186.5% over its totals from 1971. Following the second 
ballot, the Left surpassed the Chaudet list, receiving 
44, 578 votes, or 55.8%.^
The 1977 municipals were thus marked by the exceptional 
success of the Union of the Left, due in large part to the 
unity of the Communist and Socialist coaltions. This 
change was of special significance in Rennes, in the
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Catholic heartland of France, which Giscard had carried 
by a comfortable margin three years earlier.
In the years following the 1977 municipals, Rennes
joined the rest of France in experiencing a change in
economic structure. In 1954, 49% of the Rennes population
had been employed in agriculture; by 1980, that figure
20had dropped to 20%. This shift was accompanied by an 
increase in the secondary sector, so that by 1981, ap­
proximately 30% of the workforce was employed in industry-
related fields, principally aeronautics, shipbuilding,
21electronics and automobile manufacture. Unfortunately,
these changes were also marked by a rise in unemployment
to nearly 12% by 1982.
As the time for the 1983 municipals drew near, the
national government made several concessions to those
demanding greater regional autonomy. Primary among these
was the legalization of the teaching of Breton, Basque
and other regional languages in elementary and secondary
schools, as well as the allocation of funds for training
teachers in these languages.
This gesture by the Socialist government received
very favorable response in Rennes. Mitterrand had
easily carried the city in the 1981 presidential election,
22receiving 56.3% of the votes cast. Mayor Herve relied 
on his personal popularity and close ties, as Minister 
of Energy, with the national government to help ensure
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an easy victory. He presented a Union list containing
33 PS, 13PC, 4 PSU, 4 Radicals, 2 representatives of the
Union for a Democratic Brittany, and 3 Independents.
Since there was little public doubt expressed over
the election results, voter turnout was low. As a result,
neither Herve nor the opposition was able to poll a
a majority of the votes, thus necessitating a second
ballot. During the interim between the two ballots,
the only real campaigning of the election occurred, as
each party urged its members to vote. A small conflict
occurred when Herve refused to give four places on his
list to the Ecologists. Champaud, the leader of the
opposition, immediately offered four seats to the Ecologists
but they refused, unwilling to "contribute' to reinstating"
the Right in Rennes.
However, with increased participation in the second
ballot, Herve easily won re-election with 53% of the 
23vote. Despite national disenchantment with Socialist 
policies, the increased regional autonomy granted by the 
Socialists prompted Rennes to continue its eager embrace 
of the new ideology.
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CHAPTER V
NANTES
Nantes has long enjoyed a role as a prosperous
shipping center thanks to its location about 30 miles
from the point at which the Loire River flows into the
ocean. Considered by many as the principal city in western
France, it serves as the link between the Atlantic and the
1rest of the country. During the days of Brittany's 
autonomy, Nantes was its capital city; today, with a 
population of nearly 250,000, it has the largest ship­
building industry in France.
While Nantes is reknowned for shipping, it also serves 
as an important industrial center for food processing, 
engineering, and chemical production. The shipbuilding, 
refining and engineering firms are located close to the 
port and, in recent years, have experienced a sharp 
decline in activity; the lighter branches of industry
located in the city's periphery have had a higher growth 
2
rate. Agriculture and horticulture have been confined to
the zone encircling Nantes, and the city has remained
principally an industrial town. The period from 1954
showed a sharp decline in the proportion of the labor force
working in agriculture, falling from 42% in 1954 to 18%
1980. As industry suffered an economic crisis in the
76.
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1980s, Nantes experienced a sharp rise in unemployment, 
growing to more than 12% in 1982, greater than that 
experienced by either Lyon or Rennes. Thus, an indus­
trial environment likely to favor the development of 
socialism continued to suffer under a Socialist presidency.
In the months immediately preceding the municipal 
elections of 1971, Nantes was plagued by unrest centering 
in the factories. An especially severe incident occurred 
on January 16 at the Batignolles boiler works factory
3
which employed 1850 people. The CFDT and CGT had urged 
their union members to stop work for two hours in order 
to strengthen their position in negotiations with manage­
ment. During the work stoppage, a group of 300 workers 
headed for the managerial offices. Twenty managed to enter 
and committed severe damage to the office of the chief of 
personnel, breaking typewriters, phones, and a bulletin 
board while the six secretaries left the office by a 
window. One hour later, additional trouble broke out in 
the factory, rresulting in tens of thousands of francs 
worth of damage.
The unrest at Batignolles succeeded in disturbing 
the social peace of Nantes. Since the factory workers 
share a common apprenticeship and thus form a closely- 
knit community, there was grave concern that the entire 
city would be divided by unrest. After three days of a
7 8 :
closed factory, the Batignolles workers decided to strike,
even though the CGT favored a return to work. To aid
the families of striking workers, the mayor's office
solicited funds to provide free school lunches for
4
children and to deliver loaves of bread. As factory 
workers regularly rallied in the town and marched on 
various government offices, their numbers were augmented 
by students and other workers.
With this background, preparations began for the 
March elections. The Socialist party's section decided 
to remain part of the coalition list prepared by Mayor 
Andre Morice, president of the party known as the Centre 
republicain. This list included 10 Socialists, 8 members 
of the Rassemblement democratique, 13 Independents, and four 
who were non-aligned.
Mayor Morice had been praised for his idea of forming 
commissions of up to 30 residents capable of giving advice 
on local problems to the Mayor and his team. Created in 
1965, these commissions had facilitated communication 
between the community and its administrators, and were 
especially admired by Mayor Henri Freville of Rennes, who 
used them as the focus of his campaign for re-election.
As the strike continued, two other lists formed to 
challenge Morice. One was led by conservative Albert 
Dassie of the UDR; the other, titled "the united list for 
a modern, socialist and democratic administration," was 
led by Michel Moreau of the PC and attempted to capitalize
79.
on the atmosphere of the strike to underscore the need for 
change in all facets of management.
In February, the faculties of law and economics of 
the University of Nantes launched their own strike. Soon, 
police became a semi-permanent presence around the campus. 
Clearly, the resulting intellectual malaise contributed 
to the technical and industrial malaise Nantes already 
suffered.
Fortunately for the incumbent mayor, the 46 days of 
general strike ended on March 2, two weeks before the 
election. The resulting atmosphere of relief and renewed 
urban energy was sufficient to ensure re-election for 
Morice and his list in the first round of voting.
Receiving 58.2% of the votes cast, Morice surpassed the 
26.2% received by the UDR and the 15.6% of the PC chal-
5
lengers. The new municipal council comprised 14 
Socialists, 3 Republicans, 4 Unionists, 3 Democrats,
2 of the Action sociale, and 11 Independents.
While the Socialists were, in effect, junior members 
of Morice's centrist coalition in 1971, by 1977 they had 
gained the political experience and recognition necessary 
to gain votes on their own. In January of 1977, the 
national PS declared that the strategy of the Union of 
the Left would be enforced in the upcoming municipal 
elections. The Nantes Socialist councillors who refused 
to abandon the coalition which had brought them into
office were expelled from the party.
Simultaneously, the Democratic Breton Union (a
militant regional group seeking a Socialist Brittany)
announced its intention to present its own list. This
decision was sparked by the refusal of the three leftist
parties, the PS, PC and MRG, to allow the Breton group
to participate in the Union of the Left. The Union list
preferred to remain remote from any charges of militancy,
allocating 25 seats to the PS, 15 to the PC (instead of
7
the 17 it had requested), and 7 to the Radicals.
On February 3, the incumbent mayor, Morice, presented 
the list which he would head. He emphasized that his list 
was "apolitical," consisting of 8 Democratic Socialists,
8 members of the CNIP, 7 CR, 6 RPR, 6 RI, 6 members of 
the CDS, and 7 other leftist representatives. Among the 
candidates was Loic Sparfel, president of the University
g
of Nantes.
Morice counted on the fact that, ever since the 
Liberation, Communists and Socialists had never been 
truly united in Nantes. The modification of the electoral 
law in 1964 ousted the PCF from City Hall, while the 
Socialists entered as part of Morice's team. This 
majority coalition, described as "a great national reunion, 
ranged from the extreme Right, with partisans of French 
Algeria, to the SFIO. In 1971, Morice had easily defeated 
the Gaullist and Communist lists, but by 1977, the arrival
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of many more militant Socialists dissolved the federation. 
However, the union between the PC and PS was tenuous 
at best, with the PC, especially, dubious of the fidelity 
of its partner.
During the first round of voting, the Union of the 
Left received 44% of the vote, barely surpassing the 
43.7% received by Morice1s list, while other small
9
Left-wing parties earned 12.% But during the second round
the Left scored an equally narrow and surprising success;
10it was victorious with 50.29% of the votes cast.
Thus, two characteristics of the 1977 municipal
elections are of particular significance: the remarkable
success of the Union of the Left and the electoral bonus
because of this unity. Presenting joint lists in 200 of
the 221 large cities, in many cases representing a change
from a Socialist-Centrist to a Socialist-Communist
coalition, the Left gained control of 159 of the 221 
11cities. Cities with populations greater than 30,000
led by Socialist administrations passed from 47 in 1971
to 81 in 1977 . 12
The Socialist victory of 1977 proved an effective
harbinger of national victory in 1981. Mitterrand
scored 51.55% of the votes in Nantes to the 48.44% won 
13by Giscard. However, by 1983, as unemployment continued 
unabated, and the economic growth promised by the 
national government failed to touch Nantes' industries, 
electoral sentiment was quite different. In January,
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the Union of the Left led by incumbent mayor Alain Chenard 
presented its list for the March municipal elections. 
Included were representatives of the PS, PC, MRG, UDG 
and the left-wing Gaullists. The opposition's list was 
led by Michel Chauty, a senator and representative of the 
RPR. In addition, two other lists were announced in 
February. One of these, with an extreme Left platform, 
united two small far-Left parties. The other, entitled 
"Nantes First," was led by Andre Routier Preuvost, former 
member of the SFIO and assistant to former mayor Morice.
The presence of three diverse lists on the Left,
facing a united opposition, demonstrated the ineffectiveness
of the Socialist administration. This was validated in
the election results, where the opposition received
50.48% of the votes to the 39.7% received by the Union of
the Left.^ The 1983 Council was made up of 16 RPR,
16 UDF, 8 CNIP, 8 Moderates, 7 PS, 3 PC, 1 UDB, 1 MRG,
and 1 Gaullist; 26 Socialists and 15 Communists had to
15relinquish their seats.
The defeat was compounded by uneven voter partici­
pation. In the more exclusive residential districts, voter 
participation stood at 97%, while it was no more than 55% 
in the working- and middle-class districts. As the "symbol 
of the conquest of the West" in 1977, the loss of Nantes 
was a severe blow to the Socialist party.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The municipal elections of Nantes, Rennes and Lyon 
provide evidence that, under certain conditions, national 
politics follow the dictates of local experience. The 
rise to power of the Socialists in Rennes and Nantes in 
1977, mirrored by the consolidation of Socialist forces 
in Lyon, paved the way for the national victory of Francois 
Mitterrand. The disaffection with Socialist policies 
demonstrated by the 1983 municipal election results in 
Lyon and Nantes, while Rennes benefitted from increased 
regional autonomy under the early days of its Socialist 
administration, are much more typical of the regional 
sentiment in 1983.
As discussed in Chapter I, local elections can have 
significant relevance for politics on a national scale.
The rise of the Socialist party in Lyon, Rennes and Nantes 
during the period of 1971 to 1983 is not an isolated 
example, but rather illustrated the factors necessary for 
a party to most effectively develop political strategy on 
the municipal level.
The first, and perhaps most vital, factor is the 
presence of a decentralized government. In the decen-
84.
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tralized governments illustrated by France and West 
Germany, political parties are able to demonstrate their 
ability to govern in a municipal forum, as well as exer­
cising their skills at implementing policies and shaping 
regional concerns. In France, local authorities are able 
to implement their policies independently, developing 
their own budgets and financing. This makes local political 
power even more useful to parties than it would be in a 
country such as Britain, where financial power is tightly 
controlled by Westminster. Thus, for a political party 
to develop its skills while demonstrating those skills to 
the voting public, local politics must be free of the 
regionalism and dependence on a remote national government 
which marks politics in Britain.
A second important factor is the element of significant 
voter participation in municipal elections, as in France 
and West Germany. In France, generally 3/4 of the 
population vote in municipal elections, while the figure 
for Germany ranges from 50-85% as stated earlier. Lacking 
the participation of at least one-half of the population, 
election results can not be regarded as a tool for pre­
dicting a party's support on the regional level.
Third, it is valuable for the political party.to have 
in its recent history a certain exclusion from power at 
the national level, exemplified by the Left in both France 
and Italy. In France, the Left was able to represent a 
significant change to voters disaffected by the unemployment,
86.
inflation and unrest which had occurred under a Con­
servative administration. Not only were the Left's 
policies and principles significantly new, they had 
also been absent from power long enough to seem fresh 
and untainted by the failures of past administrations.
In Italy, the transition has been occurring gradually, as 
the PCI makes inroads on a municipal level to the 
political power long held by the Christian Democratic 
party. Thus, the voters look to these parties with hope 
and the belief that they represent a will for change.
Finally, it is important for the party to maintain 
a flexible attitude toward coalition-building. The party 
leadership must be willing to form effective coaditions, 
such as those with the PC that aided early PS victories, 
yet able to dissolve those coalitions and stand alone as 
soon as those alliances become liabilities. The municipal 
victories also serve as important testing grounds for 
coalitions, proving their ability to shy away from extremes 
and yet govern effectively, as in the successful lists 
formed by Mayor Louis Pradel of Lyon.
In sum, these four factors can determine the national 
relevance of local elections. Lacking them, in countries 
such as Britain, it is much more difficult for a party to 
build a national strategy based upon municipal efforts. 
However, with these four factors present, a party may 
build municipal victories into a national mandate.
87 .
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